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1 Introduction 
It appears that the United Kingdom has been quite successful with a political agenda 
that many countries have adopted later on: the privatisation of pension provision. At 
the beginning of the 1980s both state and non-state actors had their roles as providers 
of old age pensions, the state’s role being rather weak by European standards. Still, 
the Thatcher government set out to widen the scope of occupational and individual 
private pension provision further while containing the future costs of state pensions. 
When the New Labour government took office, it abolished the previous State Earn-
ings-Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) for a new State Second Pension that offers bet-
ter value for employees on low earnings. The state scheme will become less generous 
for its remaining members, who are expected to contract out, taking advantage of the 
new stakeholder pensions. 
If one takes a closer look however, it becomes apparent that things are not quite that 
simple. State and private pensions in Britain interact in many ways. To find the ap-
propriate regulatory framework for private pensions and to achieve a sustainable 
public/private mix in pension provision remains high on the political agenda (Bonoli 
and Palier 2000: 173).  
These aims trigger further state intervention. There never really was a clear-cut 
boundary between the public and the private spheres during the past 20 years of 
British pension policy. But the distinction of the two is even more blurred today. 
Drawing on recent theoretical approaches highlighting changes in the social produc-
tion of welfare (especially the growth of “welfare markets” and the rise of the “regu-
latory welfare state”), I will compare the public/private mix of the UK pension sys-
tem of the early 1980s with the present setting and analyse to what extent these 
measures may be characterised as “privatisation” in this context. I will argue that 
whilst the term is quite appropriate regarding some aspects of the process (e.g. lower 
state benefits, new private actors, more choice for individuals) it seems less so for 
others: “Private” pensions are subsidised and heavily regulated by the state. Insuffi-
cient “private” provision and means tested state benefits are linked in multiple ways. 
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Empirically my analysis draws partly on 31 expert interviews I conducted with deci-
sion makers, experts and influential actors in the field of old-age security in the UK 
in 2004/5.2 In the first part of this paper I will sketch out the UK pension landscape of 
the early 1980s (2). Then I will illustrate the changes that led to the current arrange-
ment (3) which is outlined afterwards (4). This provides the background for the as-
sessment of whether the term “privatization” aptly describes these changes (5). I will 
finally delineate the problems inherent in the British pension policy approach (6) be-
fore I close with some concluding remarks (7).  
2 The British Pension Landscape of the early 1980s 
The foundations of the post-war British pension system were laid when the 1946 Na-
tional Insurance Act introduced a Basic State Pension (BSP) which since remained 
largely unchanged. It is financed by National Insurance contributions (NICs) made 
by employees and their employers and by the self-employed. While contributions are 
earnings-related, the BSP is flat-rate. The level of the Basic Pension is dependent on 
contributions only in respect to the length of the contribution period, but not on the 
amount of contributions paid. A full Basic Pension is available after paying contribu-
tions for 44 years (men) or 39 years (women).3 For those with shorter contribution 
histories the Basic Pension is reduced accordingly, with the minimum of a quarter of 
the full amount available after 9 years of contribution (men: 14 years). A full BSP 
equalled 20 per cent of average earnings in 1977/78. Until 1980 the BSP was uprated 
in line with average earnings or retail price inflation, whichever was the greater. Af-
terwards it was only raised in line with retail price inflation which meant that it lost 
value in relative terms. The low level of benefits meant that even a full BSP was be-
low the level of means tested Income Support. 
__________ 
2 The interviewees were Members of Parliament with a special interest in pensions or policy advisers, 
they worked for government departments (DWP, Treasury, GAD), regulatory bodies (OPRA, OPB, 
FSA), or for pension providers or in diverse organisations (NAPF, CBI, ABI, TUC, the Pensions Man-
agement Institute – PMI, the Society of Pension Consultants – SPC, the Investment Management Insti-
tute – IMA, the Association of Pension Lawyers – APL, Which?, PPI, The Association of Corporate 
Trustees – TACT, Age Concern, National Pensioners Convention - NPC, the Actuarial Profession, and 
the Association of Consulting Actuaries – ACA). Still, the views they expressed in the interviews did 
not necessarily represent those officially held by their organizations. 
3 When the pension age for women will be raised to 65 between 2010 and 2020, the number of years 
necessary for a full BSP will be increased accordingly. 
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On top of the BSP the 1975 Social Security Pensions Act introduced the State Earn-
ings Related Pension Scheme (SERPS). Entitlements towards SERPS could only be 
build up by employees and only on ‘band earnings’ between the Lower Earnings 
Limit (LEL) and the Upper Earnings Limit (UEL). These ‘reckonable earnings’ were 
revalued in line with the rise of average earnings in the whole economy until retire-
ment. A full SERPS pension originally provided a quarter of an individual’s average 
revalued reckonable earnings. In order to make SERPS mature more rapidly, benefits 
were based on the best 20 years of earnings since its introduction in 1978. After re-
tirement SERPS was to be indexed to prices. SERPS benefits were available from 
State Pension Age, i.e. age 60 for women and 65 for men.  
The UK has a strong tradition of occupational pension provision. The pension plans 
are usually set up as trusts by the employer. So the scheme’s assets are independent 
of the sponsoring company, which has to make up for possible deficits. Employers 
could make membership in their pension scheme a condition of employment. The 
schemes were overseen by the Occupational Pensions Board (OPB) set up by the So-
cial Security Act 1973. The board members were representatives of employers and 
employees and of the actuarial profession. The OPB also served as an advisory body 
on pensions policy for the government (see Bonoli 2000: 61). 
Occupational pension arrangements were tax benefited. Pension contributions up to 
a limit set by the Inland Revenue (IR) were tax free. Capital gains of pension funds 
were tax free, provided the funding level did not exceed the IR limit of 105 per cent 
of the Projected Benefit Obligation.4 Fund surpluses above these limits had to be re-
duced within five years by means of increased benefits or reduced contributions (so-
called contribution holidays) to sustain the tax approved status. Pension benefits 
were taxable but a part of them could be taken as a tax free lump sum. Additionally, 
pensioners enjoyed higher tax allowances and were likely to be in a lower tax band. 
__________ 
4 The limits in respect to the Projected Benefit Obligation set for tax purposes must not be confused 
with the much lower Minimum Funding Requirement (MFR) introduced by the 1995 Pensions Act 
(see below).  
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When the SERPS predecessor Graduate Pension5 was introduced, those employees 
who were members of an occupational pension scheme could contracted out of the 
state scheme and remain in their occupational arrangements instead. This was in-
tended to maintain strong occupational provision. But membership of these plans 
tended to be skewed towards male white-collar employees in larger enterprises and 
in the public sector. The state scheme was thought of as a fall-back for those without 
access to occupational schemes.  
Under SERPS the established contracting out option continued, provided these 
schemes offered a so-called Guaranteed Minimum Pension (GMP), that is, benefits at 
least broadly equivalent to SERPS. Hence, only salary related schemes (i.e. working 
on a defined benefit basis) could contract out. Contracting out resulted in a National 
Insurance contribution rebate, representing the SERPS entitlements given up. Thus 
the function of SERPS in the British Pension Landscape was threefold. It provided an 
earnings related pension for its members and it established a minimum standard for 
the contracted out arrangements. The third function appears to be the most astonish-
ing: Even though someone might have contracted out, s/he would still be entitled to 
her/his SERPS pension minus GMP from the state scheme. “[T]he GMP refers to the 
occupational scheme’s obligation, but not to the employee’s entitlement. Whether 
contracted in or out, an employee is statutorily entitled to the amount that would 
have been payable under contracted-in provision” (O’Higgins 1986: 138). Unlike 
SERRPS, the GMP did not have the best 20 years rule. The indexation of earnings 
during working life was less complete under GMP than under SERPS, particularly 
for those changing jobs frequently. Survivor’s benefits were less generously calcu-
lated. Finally, there was no requirement for an indexation of the GMP after retire-
ment. So the state scheme actually provided price indexation for contracted out oc-
cupational schemes (O’Higgins 1986: 138). “This leads to the curious result that those 
who opt for private occupational provision by contracting out may still receive the 
majority of their second tier pension from the state” (O’Higgins 1986: 140). 
__________ 
5 The Graduated Pension was negligible, because its value eroded to high inflation. There was no in-
dexation of benefits before 1975 (O’Higgins 1986: 112). 
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Thus Whiteside concludes: “The state not only permitted contracting out, but un-
derwrote the viability of the schemes that chose to do so – a move that extended pub-
lic liability in an unprecedented fashion” (Whiteside 2003: 31). 
O’Higgins regards the arrangement that prevailed into the early 1980s as a bad deal 
for the state. “The 1975 settlement of the shape of the British pension package can 
therefore be characterized as a structure of subsidized competition: the state created 
a structure within which private provision could compete with state provision on 
more-than-equal terms. […] The state […] undertook to pay for guarantees which the 
private sector (because of factors like uncertainty, timescale, etc.) felt unable to pro-
vide for” (O’Higgins 1986: 139). 
Walker (2001) looks upon the arrangements more favourably. Her focus is not on the 
provider side and the public expenditure caused by the interaction of private and 
public, but on the consumer. “[T]he original SERPS framework provided a genuine 
partnership between the state and occupational pension schemes in which the state 
promoted good quality schemes and protected the position of those contracted out” 
(Walker 2001: 131).  
O’Higgins (1986) concludes in his analysis that “the label ‘private provision’ is a mis-
nomer because it conceals a complex mix of public and private finance.” (O’Higgins 
1986: 140f.). One could not possibly argue with that assessment. But still the regula-
tory framework of private occupational pensions was relatively weak, and there was 
a clear commitment by the state how much it was willing to provide. Over the next 
two decades both features of the arrangement were about to change. Both the state 
promise and the regulatory framework were to change frequently. Whereas the for-
mer was often to be reduced the latter would tend to densify. The complexity of the 
public/private interaction was to become impenetrable. I will now turn to the 
changes that have occurred. 
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3 Two Decades of Pension Reform 
3.1 Increasing the scope of private provision, part I : The 1985/86 reforms 
The Conservative Thatcher government was very concerned about the future cost of 
SERPS introduced by its Labour predecessor. In a policy Green Paper entitled “Re-
form of Social Security” it proposed to abolish SERPS in favour of “a system in which 
everybody is able to contribute either to an occupational pension scheme or to a per-
sonal pension” (DSS 1985a: 24). The government made clear that they wanted more 
than just to cut back the state scheme: “The government accept the need to tackle the 
open-ended commitments of SERPS. But we do not believe it would be right to respond on 
a purely negative basis by simply ending or restricting SERPS without putting anything in 
its place.” (DSS 1985b: 5; my italics). 
The original plans to put an end to SERPS faced opposition by some organizations 
such as Age Concern, the Trade Union Congress (TUC), the Labour Party and, per-
haps more surprisingly, by the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), the National 
Association of Pension Funds (NAPF) and even the Treasury (Bonoli 2000: 71ff.). 
Consequently the government aimed in its White Paper (DSS 1985c) merely at con-
taining the future costs of SERPS and at widening the scope of contracting out, but it 
left the scheme in existence.  
The changes to SERPS were to be phased in over a transitional period until 2010. The 
best 20 years rule was eradicated. SERPS was now to be calculated based on lifetime 
earnings. The level of SERPS was reduced from 25 per cent to 20 per cent of revalued 
reckonable earnings. SERPS rights inherited by widows and widowers were reduced 
from the full to the half amount of the member’s pension. Contracted out occupa-
tional pension funds now had to inflation-proof GMPs up to 3 per cent, thus reduc-
ing the amount of SERPS benefits payable to those who contracted out (see DSS 
1985c: 4) 
In order to expand the scope of private provision, contracting out was extended to 
occupational money purchase schemes (i.e. working on a defined contribution basis). 
Since these schemes did not promise a defined level of benefits, the GMP was not 
applicable as a contracting out criteria. Instead, a minimum contribution at the level 
7 
Pension „Privat i sat ion“  in Br i ta in / 31 .07 .05   
of the contracting out rebate was prescribed as a condition for leaving the state 
scheme. The pension fund had to be used to buy an annuity at retirement. That part 
of the pension pot that was generated by the National Insurance rebate was called 
“protected rights” and had to be used to buy an unisex annuity6. While salary related 
schemes meant an open-ended liability for the employers, money purchase schemes 
allowed them to know their responsibility. It was expected that this would foster the 
set-up of industry-wide schemes and encourage smaller employers to offer occupa-
tional pensions. 
Personal pensions, purchased on an individual level on a defined contribution basis, 
were also established. They were a further way to contract out of SERPS in order to 
allow them “to compete fairly with the state and occupational schemes” (DSS 1985c: 
15). Again, at least the contracting out rebate had to be paid in. Pension scheme 
members were given the right to pay additional voluntary contributions (AVCs) in 
order to boost their pension entitlements. Personal pensions were thought to im-
prove individual choice and the portability of pension rights for job changers. It was 
now no longer possible for employers to make membership in their occupational 
pension funds a condition of employment. Besides insurance companies, banks and 
other financial bodies were as well enabled to offer personal pension arrangements. 
In addition to the contracting out rebate there was also tax relief on contributions 
towards a personal pension.  
In its ambition to improve the portability of pension rights, the 1986 Pension Act 
built on the reforms of the 1985 Social Security Act that had established that pension 
rights of early leavers had to be increased in line with prices up to 5 per cent. Every-
one leaving a scheme had the right to a transfer value representing his deferred pen-
sion rights which s/he could put in a new scheme, a single premium annuity or a 
personal pension,7 and schemes were required to disclose relevant information to 
their members (DSS 1985c: 5). 
__________ 
6 Usually, annuity rates for men are more favourably than those for women due to the differences in 
life expectancy. 
7 Before that it was estimated that only 5 per cent of job changers had their pension entitlements trans-
ferred to the new employer. 75 per cent only retrieved their own contributions (i.e. without the em-
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Private provision was to be encouraged by means of financial incentives. “Employers 
setting up new schemes and individuals setting up their own new personal pension 
for the first time will be given an additional national insurance rebate for a five year 
period. This will amount to 2 per cent over and above the standard rate” (DSS 1985c: 
5). 
The 1985 White Paper stresses the importance of investor protection for personal 
pensions. “The importance of adequate investor protection is central to encouraging 
more occupational and personal pensions. People have a right to know that the sav-
ings on which their income in retirement will depend are properly safeguarded” 
(DSS 1985c: 17). Particularly, a new financial services legislation “should protect the 
public against overselling by the use of misleading projections of returns.” (DSS 
1985c: 17). 
In order to protect the money locked away in personal pensions the schemes had to 
be approved by the OPB. “The Board’s main concern will be that people holding per-
sonal pensions will be properly protected, while ensuring that the rules are as simple 
and flexible as possible. They will be responsible for seeing that personal pensions 
comply with government regulations, meet appropriate investment standards and 
offer compensation in the event of negligence, fraud or theft” (DSS 1985c: 17). 
3.2 The 1995 Reforms – Securing the pension promise 
The promotion of private pensions by the Thatcher government had in some ways 
been surprisingly successful. About ten years after the 1986 reforms roughly one-half 
of the employees who were members of SERPS in 1985 had left the scheme. 68 per 
cent of employees were contracted out, and only 17 per cent remained in SERPS8 
(Budd and Campbell 1998: 100). Originally, the Department of Social Security (DSS) 
had assumed that about half a million people would take out personal pensions, but 
as early as by the end of April 1990 four million had been sold (Budd and Campbell 
__________ 
ployers part or any interest). The remainder were entitled to a deferred pension. In this case future 
wage increases were not taken into account when calculating entitlements (Bonoli 2000: 64). 
8 The remainder were neither members of SERPS nor of a contracted out arrangement mainly due to 
an income below the Lower Earnings Limit (Budd and Campbell 1998: 100). 
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1998: 110). Due to the incentives granted, the unpredicted demand for personal pen-
sion was quite costly for the government.  
The extra 2 per cent rebate – some have called it a bribe – made it particularly advan-
tageous for young people to contract out of SERPS and to contract back in at a later 
date. This was due to an effect called back-loading of benefits: Compared to the de-
fined contribution personal pensions, benefits under SERPS accrue more heavily in 
later years. Since there was no rule to prevent contracting back in, special age-related 
rebates have been offered since 1993 to discourage these tendencies. All in all, it was 
estimated that instead of saving money the net costs for government over the first ten 
years of the existence of personal pensions were about £10 billion (Blake 2003: 335). 
Tempted by the additional 2 per cent incentive and/or ill-advised by salespeople 
some hundreds of thousands people who had better remained in the state scheme 
because of low income or discontinuous careers opted for a personal pension. Addi-
tionally, between 1988 and 1993 about half a million members of occupational 
schemes moved to personal pensions.9 As many as 90 per cent of these were given 
inappropriate advice. Although often staying with the same employer they moved to 
a personal pension towards which the employer did not contribute and which took a 
significant part of the transfer value in commission and administrative charges 
(Blake 2003: 334). These proceedings came to be known as the mis-selling of personal 
pensions. Blake quotes the example of a miner who transferred to a personal pension 
in 1989, five years prior to his retirement. Instead of a lump sum of £5,125 and a pen-
sion of £1,791 from his former occupational pension he received only £ 2,576 as a 
lump sum and a monthly pension of £734 form his new scheme (Blake 2003: 334).  
The safeguards proposed in the 1995 White Paper proved to be insufficient in an-
other incident too, even though this one did not relate particularly to the 1985/86 
reforms. The event is connected to the name of Robert Maxwell, the media tycoon. 
When Maxwell’s body was found in November 1991 in the waters near the Canary 
Islands it soon became clear that he had misappropriated money from the occupa-
tional pension funds of his companies, such as the Mirror Group, in an attempt to 
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restore the solvency of other companies under his control, boost share prices and 
keep his diverse businesses running. As the investigation of the Department for 
Trade and Industry noted “Mr Robert Maxwell had always regarded the pension 
funds as his” and “ran his companies and the pension funds as if they were one” 
(DTI 2001: Summary). After Maxwell’s mysterious death the pension funds were 
found to be severely underfunded and their members were at risk of loosing what 
was promised to them. 
The incident regarding the Mirror Group pension scheme caused a public outcry and 
severe concerns about the governance of pension schemes and the security of pen-
sion money. In due course the Pension Law Review Committee, chaired by Roy 
Goode, was given the task of reviewing the legal framework of private pension pro-
vision. In its report it pointed out that the law should seek to protect the “’pension 
promise’”, i.e. the “reasonable expectations” that accrued rights are protected and 
benefits will be provided according to the scheme’s rules and legal requirements 
(Pension Law Review Committee 1993: 10). The Committee proposed the set-up of a 
pensions regulator, better protection of rights accrued in the past, member participa-
tion on the trustee board, better and clearer information to members, minimum sol-
vency requirements and a compensation scheme to cover scheme deficits arising 
from fraud, theft or misappropriation. The proposals of the Committee became part 
of the 1995 Pensions Act. 
The Act set up the Occupational Pensions Regulatory Authority (OPRA) to replace 
and take over the responsibilities of the OPB except the advisory role. OPRA was 
given extensive powers, e.g. to remove and appoint pension scheme trustees under 
certain conditions, to wind-up or modify schemes under specific circumstances and 
to impose penalties for misconduct. OPRA also had far-reaching investigative pow-
ers, such as to require trustees, managers or professional advisers of a scheme or the 
sponsoring employer to produce any scheme-related document, to enter premises 
were scheme members are employed, scheme related-documents are kept or the 
__________ 
9 The extra rebate was only available to former SERPS members in order not to encourage members of 
occupational schemes to leave their employers plans (Bonoli 2000: 79). 
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scheme administration is carried out and to question any person on those premises 
(Blake 2003: 342). 
A minimum funding requirement (MFR) was also introduced by the 1995 Pensions 
Act, intended to make sure that the assets of a scheme at least match its liabilities. If 
the scheme was running with an underprovision of up to 10 per cent the shortfall 
would have to made good within five years. A serious underprovision below the 
level of 90 per cent MFR would have to be restored to the 90 per cent level within 
three years time (Blake 2003: 345f.). 
Scheme members were given the right to nominate at least one trustee (at least two in 
larger schemes with more than 100 members) who cannot be removed by the em-
ployer without the consent of all other trustees (Blake 2003: 344). 
A Pension Compensation Board was established to provid compensation if a 
scheme’s assets were reduced by an illegal act and if the employer is insolvent. Pay-
ments were limited to 90 per cent of the loss or the amount necessary to restore the 
scheme to 90 per cent of the MFR. 
The 1995 Pensions Act went beyond the proposals of the Goode Committee. The ob-
ligation for personal pension holders to buy an annuity at retirement was relaxed 
with the 1995 Finance Act. It was now possible to postpone annuitisation until the 
age of 75. In the meantime part of the pension pot could be accessed by means of in-
come drawdown. 
Again, measures were taken to reduce the cost and thus limit the generosity of 
SERPS, by changing the formula for the calculation of benefits. The method of re-
valuation of earnings under SERPS was modified, in order to prevent earnings below 
the LEL to generate entitlements (for details see Budd and Campbell 1998: 111). Ad-
ditionally, following a rule of the European Court of Justice the pension age of men 
and women was equalised. The state retirement age for women was subsequently 
raised to 65, gradually phased in over a period between 2010 and 2020. 
The GMP was abolished in favour of a reference scheme test. This finally put an end 
to the (partial) inflation-proofing of occupational pension schemes by SERPS. At the 
12 
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same time occupational funds were now required to provide a limited price indexa-
tion of benefits up to 5 per cent per year. 
3.3 Increasing the scope of private provision, part II: The New Labour reforms 
The Labour Party was strongly opposed to the Conservative pensions policy of the 
1980s and 1990s, particularly to the attempt to abolish SERPS. However, at the time 
they eventually came to power they followed the route of their predecessors in many 
respect. When the New Labour government took office in 1997, their major reforms 
of the pension system were the replacement of SERPS by a State Second Pension 
(S2P), the introduction of Stakeholder Pensions (a kind of no-frills personal pension 
aimed at moderate earners) and the implementation of a means tested Minimum In-
come Guarantee, soon replaced by the more sophisticated Pensions Credit. They also 
strengthened the regulation of financial services by establishing a single Financial 
Services Authority (FSA).  
The overall aim was to direct state pensions primarily to those in greatest need and 
to expand private provision for all others. “Those who are able, should save what 
they can for their retirement. The Government should support those who cannot 
save and regulate the pension system effectively. The private sector should provide 
affordable and secure second pensions” (DSS 1998: 3). 
The replacement of SERPS by the S2P had two intentions: to improve benefits for low 
earners and – in the long run – to make S2P unattractive to anyone earning above 
roughly £9,000 annually. In order to do so the accrual rates were raised for everyone 
earning between a Lower Earnings Threshold (LET) and an Upper Earnings Thresh-
old (UET) set at £9,000 and £18,500 respectively,10 in a way that benefited those on 
lowest earnings most. Everyone earning between the LEL and the LET was deemed 
as earning as much as the LET. So unlike SERPS, which only had a single accrual 
rate, S2P had different accrual rates on (future) band earnings. In line with the higher 
benefits of S2P that would be given up, contracting out rebates were to be increased 
for persons in the respective income band.  
__________ 
10 1998 figures. The earnings thresholds were to be increased in line with earnings. The UEL roughly 
equals average earnings. 
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In the long run it is intended to turn S2P into a flat rate benefit at the level envisaged 
for people earning at the LET. But, up to now no measures have been taken to im-
plement that last step. After all, New Labour (almost) succeeded in doing what even 
the Conservatives did not dare: putting an end to state earnings related pensions in 
Britain. 
Those who are still members of the S2P but earn above the LET were expected to 
contract out into a private pension, particularly opting for the stakeholder pensions 
introduced in 2001. These are, basically, a form of personal pensions which have to 
fulfil some minimum standards. Charges are caped at 1 per cent11 of the fund, there 
are no penalties for starting or stopping contribution, the scheme has to accept con-
tribution payments as little of as £20 and employers with more than five employees 
who do not offer an occupational scheme or contribute towards a group personal 
pension have to designate a stakeholder scheme and enable their employees to make 
contributions directly from their pay (Emmerson 2003: 174). Since stakeholder pen-
sions have to comply to a given set of standards, they can be sold under a simplified 
advice regime. 
In the long run the government expected their measures to lead to a situation where 
about 60 per cent of pensioner income would be derived from private sources and 
only 40 per cent from the state, thus reversing the current public/private mix (DSS 
1998: 8, 31f, 103). 
The introduction of S2P and stakeholder schemes did nothing to alleviate the situa-
tion of those pensioners currently entitled to means tested Income Support. Instead 
of raising the BSP across the board,12 the New Labour government introduced a 
Minimum Income Guarantee (MIG) to improve the income for those on lowest 
means. The MIG was set at £75 per week for a single pensioner and £116.60 for a cou-
ple13. That meant the MIG was set well above a full BSP of £67.50 for a single person 
at that time. The MIG was to be increased in line with earnings while, on the other 
__________ 
11 From April 2005 the price cap over the first 10 years is 1.5 per cent. As Wynn (2001) suggests there 
may well be additional charges that are not caped. 
12 Still, in 2001 and 2002there had been increases to the BSP above inflation. 
13 1999/2000 figures 
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hand, BSP was only inflation indexed. Thus, the gap between the two is going to 
grow wider over the long term. The advantage was that the income of the poorest 
pensioners could be raised at a substantially lower cost than with an increased BSP 
which would have benefited better off pensioners as well. MIG is means tested and 
has to be claimed. Consequently there is a gap between the number of pensioners 
entitled and of those actually claiming (see Blake 2004: 29).  
Introduced in 1999, MIG was reformed in October 2003 by the introduction of the 
Pensions Credit. One part of it, called Guarantee Credit, replaces MIG while the 
other part, called Savings Credit, aims to ensure that people with modest provision 
for retirement are better off than those without. The MIG/Guarantee Credit is avail-
able from state pension age but the Savings Credit can only be claimed from age 65.  
“For every £1 of income received that is above the level of the full BSP but below the 
level of the Guarantee Credit, the Savings Credit pays an additional benefit of 60p. 
The credit is then ‘tapered down’ for additional income above the Guaranteed Credit 
level” (PPI 2005: 3f). Unlike the MIG, which in effect had a withdrawal rate of 100 per 
cent on savings in excess of MIG, the Pension Credit’s withdrawal rate is only 40 per 
cent. It has to be noted though, that all pensioners without a full BSP, aged below 65 
or receiving other means tested benefits (e.g. housing benefit, council tax benefit) still 
face a withdrawal of up to 100 per cent. 
The New Labour government also tightened the supervision of pension provision. In 
1997 a Financial Services Authority (FSA) was created and given far reaching respon-
sibilities by the 2000 Financial Services and Market Act. Subsequently the FSA took 
over the responsibilities of a wide range of regulatory bodies in the financial services 
industry. The FSA’s objectives are the maintenance of confidence in the financial sys-
tem, the promotion of public understanding of the financial system, the securing of 
the appropriate degree of protection for consumers and the reduction of financial 
crime (FSA 2005). Still, the regulation of the governance of occupational pension 
schemes remained within the realm of OPRA. There is a shared responsibility for 
stakeholder schemes. Whereas OPRA is concerned with their governance, the FSA 
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regulates the marketing of and advice on stakeholder pensions and authorises and 
supervises the fund managing firms.  
3.4 The 2004 Pensions Act – The protection of pension rights 
In recent years there have been growing concerns about companies becoming insol-
vent and leaving behind an occupational pension scheme insufficiently funded to 
meet its liabilities. This happened even to schemes funded by more than 100 per cent 
MFR. The consequences became even more severe due to the statutory winding up 
priority order that gave pensioner’s benefits, including future increases, priority over 
the entitlements of active members, so the remaining assets were unevenly distrib-
uted among the scheme members. Many employees close to retirement found that 
after decades of contributions the pension they had expected virtually disappeared.  
The government reacted and introduced a new Pension Protection Fund (PPF). The 
PPF is going to compensate for scheme underfunding in the event of employer insol-
vency, so every member will still receive the bulk of her/his entitlements in the event 
of employer insolvency. For those above the scheme’s normal retirement age or still 
in receipt of benefits the compensation level will be 100 per cent, for the remainder of 
scheme members it is set at 90 per cent up to an overall benefit cap. The scheme is 
funded by a mainly risk-based levy charged on all eligible schemes. The PPF will also 
take over the responsibilities of the PCB (see PPF 2005, DWP n.d. b).  
For schemes wound up due to employer insolvency before 6 April 2005 when the 
PPF became operational, the 2004 Pensions Act established a Financial Assistance 
Scheme (FAS) funded by £400 million of public money over 20 years. The benefits 
available under the FAS will be caped at £12,000. (DWP n.d. a) 
The 2004 Pensions Act also intended a simplification of the regulatory framework. 
OPRA was replaced with a new Pensions Regulator (PR), following proposals of the 
Pickering Report on the simplification of private pension provision (Pickering 2002). 
The report pointed out, that OPRA had to focus on detailed compliance, but was lim-
ited in its ability to exercise its judgements, to advice pension scheme professionals 
or to comment on the ambiguities within the regulatory framework (Pickering 2002: 
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8). The PR was therefore set up to work with a proactive, risk based approach to im-
pose lighter touch regulation on well run schemes.  
The 2004 Finance Act saw a radical simplification of the tax arrangements for pen-
sions. A plethora of eight different tax regimes on pensions savings was turned into a 
single regime. Instead of age related annual contribution limits a single lifetime limit 
of £1.5m and an annual limit were introduced on tax free pension contributions. 
4 The Current British Pension System 
As the previous remarks point out, the current state of the British pension system is 
characterised by an intense public-private interplay, high complexity and wide-
spread confusion. 
“To encourage the purchase of personal savings and pension products, government 
has extended official controls over marketing, sales, and customer relations, raising 
the administrative costs of an increasingly complex system and stimulating legal de-
bates over whom (if anyone) should compensate for market failure. […] The failure 
to clarify who is precisely responsible for what – the complete confusion of pension 
finance and pension governance – distinguishes the British system …” (Clark and 
Whiteside 2003: 13). 
Moreover, pensions have been bad news over the last two decades. Incidents such as 
the Maxwell pension fraud, the mis-selling of personal pensions, insolvent compa-
nies with insufficiently funded pension funds or improper governance of the life-
insurer Equitable Life resulted in a severe decline in consumer confidence. Fuelled by 
media exaggeration these things had contagious effects on pension provision overall 
(see Casey 2003). Measures like the PPF require some time to restore consumer con-
fidence. 
Particular problems arise for low to moderate earners. As Emmerson (2003) points 
out, the majority of those within the target group for stakeholder pensions (i.e. earn-
ing in between the LET and the UET) already had a form of private provision before. 
Furthermore employees within the target group are more likely to work for smaller 
employers who do not have to designate a scheme (Emmerson 2003: 184). So there is 
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quite a debate about the virtues of this new pension vehicle. There are ubiquitous 
claims that stakeholder pensions did not work out and most stakeholder schemes 
were “empty boxes”. 
Stakeholder is not working. The vast majority of stakeholder schemes have nobody in them. […] What 
the government said was […], companies with more than five employees which do not at present pro-
vide a pension scheme for members have to nominate a stakeholder provider. They have to say ‘the 
Legal & General is our stakeholder provider’. But that’s all they have to do. Eighty per cent of all the 
nominated schemes have no members in them. No members (expert interview 1.1). 
I think certainly amongst the target group, take up has been… . A number of organisations have sug-
gested that take up could be higher (expert interview 1.7). 
At least some schemes seem to be running successfully. An example is the B&CE 
stakeholder scheme, an industry-wide plan in the construction industry with 285,000 
members (CBI 2004: 24-26). But there seems to be a lack of coordination between state 
and non-state arrangements. Those who think themselves likely to receive the Pen-
sions Credit later in life may come to the conclusion that they will not be much better 
off in the future saving today. Surely, most people will not engage in detailed calcu-
lations. But if they like to buy a pension product the salesperson will probably advise 
them not to do so because the adviser fears later accusations of mis-selling. 
One of the difficulties for the intermediaries trying to sell private pension provision is that at moment 
we’ve got a government offering… , it seems to be moving towards means tested benefits in retire-
ment. So if you don’t know what the level of those is going to be the great fear of the financial advisors 
and the apprehensive individuals they advise is for the relatively low paid if you save during your 
career and end up simply earning a private pension and loosing state means tested benefit, what have 
you gained? (expert interview 1.3)  
People with unstable employment patterns and frequent spells of unemployment are 
often unable to lock away money in a pension and would be better advised to save in 
a more liquid product (Emmerson 2003: 184).  
Since occupational pension funds in the UK invested large parts of their money in 
equities the stock market boom of the 1990s allowed employers to maintain rather 
generous pension schemes at virtually no cost, that is they could take extensive con-
tribution holidays. After the stock market crash in 2000 there have been growing con-
cerns about the funding of occupational pensions. Additionally, increasing longevity, 
the growing regulatory burden and the obligation to improve benefits as a precondi-
tion for contracting out over the years made the provision of defined benefit occupa-
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tional pensions more expensive for the employer. This development was described 
quite often in the expert interviews. 
[T]he sort of pensions that have been built up are very, very expensive and the cost and the volatility 
of that cost is now appearing in their company accounts in a way it never used to. The new accounting 
standards are making all of that transparent and finance directors have had some nasty shocks. They 
had no idea what all this would cost! They certainly know now and they’re thinking “Why are we? 
Why, you know, as part of our strategic planning and our workforce planning, why are we putting 25 
per cent of payroll costs into pensions?” (expert interview 1.2) 
So the end of the stock market boom led to the acceleration of a long-term trend of 
employers replacing defined benefit with defined contribution arrangements and 
reducing contributions, with the result of occupational pension arrangements becom-
ing less generous and more risky for the employee (see Pensions Commission 2004: 
79-125). This trend is accompanied by another. Occupational pensions are changed 
into contracted in arrangements, intended only to top-up state provision. On the em-
ployers’ side contracting back in the state S2P marks a step towards a new mode of 
risk sharing between employers and government in respect of future pension liabili-
ties.14 In some respect this represents a new “partnership in pensions”, but clearly not 
the kind of partnership the government had in mind. 
According to estimates by the consulting company Watson Wyatt, 522,000 people 
contracted back from contracted out arrangements into S2P in tax year 2002/2003. 
Among these, 319,000 people did so as a result of the replacement of salary related 
schemes with money purchase arrangements. The remaining 203,000 people chose to 
switch back from having their contracted out rebate paid into a personal pension to 
membership in S2P. Against the background of low investment returns and rising 
life expectancy the contracting out rebate is currently set at a level too low to make 
contracting out worthwhile. Therefore some providers tell their customers to con-
sider contracting back in (Knight 2004). Again, this reveals some lack of coordination 
between state and private provision. The level of the rebate is reviewed every five 
years, but investment returns might change much quicker. It has to be noted though, 
that in the past the rebate tended to be overgenerous. In the future the rebate is likely 
__________ 
14 This is exemplified in the case of the brewer Scottish & Newcastle plc in CBI (2004).  
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to be set at a higher level. This implies falling investment returns cause higher public 
costs of private provision.  
5 British Pension Policy – An Example of Privatisation? 
I will now assess whether the British pension policy of the last decades is aptly de-
scribed as a process of privatisation. 
Generally, the privatisation of pension may be pursued along different lines. It might 
be possible for a government simply to cut back state benefits assuming that people 
will turn to the market (or their employers) to acquire additional benefits (or to nego-
tiate for them at the workplace). The rationale behind this strategy would be the neo-
liberal presumption that the market knows best. Such an approach could be termed 
“passive privatisation”. But more often a flanking strategy of “active privatisation” is 
pursued by way of the creation and adaptation of appropriate markets. This might 
entail the establishment of product standards, the introduction of fiscal incentives or 
compulsion, the set-up of supervisory bodies and other means of protecting pension 
money from incompetent, fraudulent or negligent behaviour, the provision of infor-
mation and the improvement of financial literacy; in short: the creation of a regula-
tory framework for private provision. Active privatisation allows for welfare ideolo-
gies way beyond neo-liberal values (see Hyde and Dixon 2002; Hyde et al. 2003). 
With these considerations in mind, there are four possibilities to consider the appro-
priateness of the term “privatisation”, reflected in the following table that I will em-
ploy for my further analysis. 
 
Privatisation 
 passive active 
appropriate 1 3 
not appropriate 2 4 
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ad 1.) Obviously, the cut back of contributory state pension entitlements qualifies as a 
measure of passive privatisation. The BSP is only linked to inflation and thus state 
pensions loose value in relation to earnings. SERPS had been cut back several times 
under Conservative governments and since contribution limits were also price in-
dexed it was due to fall in value in the long run. This is likely to continue with the 
successor S2P. The proposed changes into a flat rate benefit will, over the long term, 
reduce S2P entitlements for all but low earners.  
ad 2.) On the other hand New Labour improved the conditions of S2P for lower earn-
ers and introduced the MIG and the Pensions Credit, thus raising the pension income 
of those most in need. So overall the elements of interpersonal redistribution within 
the system of state old-age benefits were strengthened at the expense of the elements 
of inter-temporal redistribution. There is a broad consensus among the experts that 
the pension market is unsuitable to cater for those on low income. 
More problematic, though, is the interaction of state and private benefits. The lack of 
an universal non-means tested minimum pension makes it difficult for an individual 
to judge whether additional private provision is worthwhile. So the lack of adequate 
non-means tested state pensions is partly detrimental to private provision and the 
British pension system will leave many pensioners with insufficient incomes both 
from state and non-state sources. Many experts assume a higher state pension with-
out means testing would improve the level of private provision. This contradicts the 
common notion that state benefits crowd out private savings for old-age. 
Over time, both due to this government and other governments - let’s not single out this government 
for criticism - the interface between state provision and private provision has become disjointed. And I 
think that’s one of the key reasons why we are calling for a reform of the state pension system. Be-
cause private provision should be able to build upon a solid state platform where people saving pri-
vately are not dis-incentivised by the current regime (expert interview 1.7).  
And so I’m not sure that more information, and expecting consumers to behave like rational economic 
creatures is necessarily going to solve our problems in this country and that’s why I come back to a 
universal subsistence pension that people can live on, that lifts them out of poverty. And then people 
will understand that if they want any more luxuries than that, they’re on their own and they’ve got to 
do something for themselves. And that is such a simple thing to understand, I think people could get 
their heads around that (expert interview 1.2). 
ad 3.) With the introduction of personal and stakeholder pensions active measures to 
promote non-state pensions clearly have opened the pensions market for retail pro-
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viders. Since membership of the company’s occupational pension fund could no 
longer be a condition of employment after 1988, there was an increasing competition 
among different kinds of pension providers. Together with the option to contract out 
into a money purchase (defined contribution) occupational pension, Britons face 
more choice and flexibility in old-age provision than ever. But, the rising complexity 
of the pension system caused a situation were many people find it hard to decide 
what is the right thing for them to do. 
ad 4.) Even though the state is no longer providing the price indexing of private pen-
sions there still is a significant element of cost sharing between public and private in 
private pension provision by means of tax incentives and the contracting out rebate. 
One of the most striking features of British pensions policy over the last two decades 
is the ever growing amount of regulation. This was both motivated fiscally – to re-
duce state spending on private pensions – and triggered by successive incidents of 
market failure: the Maxwell scandal, the mis-selling of personal pensions and the 
insolvency of companies with insufficiently funded pension schemes, to name the 
most important. This resulted in a large amount of rules concerning scheme govern-
ance, funding, information and advice and benefits. The last ten years have seen a set 
up of new regulatory bodies and the Pension Protection Fund. In other words: the 
actions of those in charge of private pension funds – employers, trustees, fund managers, ac-
tuaries auditors and financial advisers – are to a large extend determined by rules that were 
set by the state in order to achieve political goals and to react to perceived shortcomings of the 
system. Still, these regulations may not be sufficient to create a pension system that is 
likely to be understood and trusted by those expected to provide for their old-age 
and to generate adequate income for their future retirement.  
6 Regulated Welfare Markets and Shortcomings of the UK Approach 
There is an increasing awareness among social scientists that the provision of an ap-
propriate regulatory framework for private (pension) provision forms an integral 
part of the welfare state. While a shift from state to market implies a changing mode of 
welfare production, state regulation might still try to achieve distributional outcomes, 
or welfare goals, that are seen as appropriate. “Typically, the non-public components 
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are not completely private, but are shaped by public regulation and fiscal welfare 
such that tax advantages for individuals and firms can be secured only under the 
condition of adherence to regulatory standards” (Hinrichs 2000: 356).  
British examples are minimum standards for contributions or benefits, compulsory 
membership in either the S2P or a private equivalent, compulsory annuitisation of 
money purchase pensions in order to keep pensioners from spending their money 
too quickly, prescribed unisex-annuities for the protected rights part of private pen-
sions to achieve more equality among men and women, and arrangements to com-
pensate for market failures. The most important and most basic objective British gov-
ernments pursues by regulating private pension is to make sure that citizens do en-
gage in private provision and contributions are made at an appropriate level. This is 
supposed to give people a sufficient income in retirement without the need to fall 
back on the state. 
Whereas previously the welfare state was generally seen as opposed to markets (cf. 
Esping-Andersen’s [1990] concept of de-commodification), there is now a recognition 
of welfare provision by means of regulated “welfare markets” (Taylor-Gooby 1999; 
Nullmeier 2003) within the welfare state. “What has emerged is a public-private hy-
brid as officials attempt to adapt the market to secure political objectives with as-
toundingly restricted success” (Whiteside 2003: 32). State and market provision does 
not merely coexist, it is interconnected in many ways. The state tries to ensure that 
private provision is available, that it provides benefits in an appropriate way, and 
that people actually take advantage of private provision.  
Despite all regulatory efforts by the state, welfare market outcomes are to a large ex-
tent outside the realm of political control and not fully calculable (Nullmeier 2003: 
966). Attempts to influence the behaviour of market actors by means of regulation or 
incentives might still have unintended effects. Despite all state regulation, market 
actors will pursue their own interest. An interviewee pointed at this in connection to 
recent trends to contract back into the state scheme. 
If a scheme is going to contract out, a lot of work has to be done and that meant fees for advisors. You 
are not going to get any more fees if the companies continues to contract out; you might get some fees 
if it contracts back in again. So I think there are two issues here. One is that the incentive to contract 
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out has gone down in real terms, and two, there is work to be done so it’s a good idea to sell contract-
ing back in again (expert interview 1.8). 
If welfare markets should fail, people will turn to the government for protection. 
When it turned out that there was no member protection when companies went bust 
with insufficiently funded pension schemes, protesters took to the streets, demand-
ing government compensation. One sign read “We’ve tried to provide for our old 
age, now all we’ve got is pension rage. No fund, no hope, no future” (see Pestridge, 
2003). They pointed out that they were doing what they were asked to do by gov-
ernment, so they held the state liable for their misfortune.15 Thus the creation of state-
regulated welfare markets, or their employment for social policy goals, leads to a 
politicisation of (these) markets (Nullmeier 2003: 968; Leisering forthcoming). Be-
cause market failures are often unforeseen governments can often only react after 
problems have occurred. 
I think, overall, that pension policy has not evolved, it has tried to set up minor manoeuvres and fire-
fighting from the problems of the past (expert interview 1.1). 
But the problem that the regulator has is that it is set up by legislation, drawn up in a context of some-
thing very different. What we’re now doing is, the Pensions Bill is being put through against the con-
text of under-funded schemes. Whatever happens in the future, the circumstances won’t be quite like 
that. So you will get a regulator set up in this mindset dealing with problems that are completely dif-
ferent, perhaps a high inflation and the impact of that, and everybody will say: ‘This regulation is 
completely inappropriate!’ And the answer will be: ‘Of course it was.’ But it was set up to deal with a 
different problem (expert interview 1.8). 
On the other hand, market actors, the providers of non-state old-age provision and the (po-
tential) customers, may very well drop out of the (welfare) market.16 This is even more 
likely when the whole setting of the welfare market depends on (incentivised volun-
tary arrangements. Providers will leave the market if they see the regulatory burden 
as too heavy, or the future costs and the risks they are expected to take as too high in 
relation to their profits or other benefits, such as the chance to attract employees to 
their companies by promising an occupational pension. The customers will turn their 
back to the welfare markets if they are put off by the complexity of the arrangements, 
or by a lack of confidence in the market, or if they assume they can find a better deal 
__________ 
15 Some experts argue that the government may well have a legal liability because regulators and gov-
ernment departments have given a false impression about the safety of final salary schemes (see 
Altmann 2004 and Webb 2004). 
16 If the politicisation of welfare markets may be seen as a form of “voice”, withdrawal would be the 
“exit” option. 
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elsewhere. This might be a state scheme, or in some cases even the prospect of a 
means tested benefit in old-age. The current trend to contract back into the S2P may 
serve as an example. Others might turn to a less regulated market like non-pension 
investment products or the housing market. At the same time as there is a debate 
about the “pension crisis” and a “savings gap”17 the property market is overheated. 
This is also commented on by the experts. 
There is a widespread perception that a house is a good investment and a pension is a bad investment. 
(expert interview 3.9) 
‘Pensions’ has become a negative term for many consumers in this country and people don’t have the 
confidence any more in pension savings. And instead they’re putting their wealth into property which 
is probably not a good idea because the property market in this country is quite volatile and it’s quite 
easy to be seduced by thinking ‘Oh well, my house is worth a hundred thousand Pounds, I don’t need 
to worry!’ People have no idea about how much money they’ll actually need to have a decent income 
in retirement! (expert interview 1.2) 
Some people might not even enter the welfare market for old-age provision in the 
first place. The ability of people to plan ahead is affected by difficulties to imagine 
the future, the degree to which peoples actions are informed by what others do 
around them and by the amount and the of resources that people command. So those 
with insecure lives face difficulties to plan ahead (Rowlingson 2002). For them a vol-
untary regulated welfare market approach is unlikely to result in adequate pension 
income. 
7 Conclusion 
Does the British pension policy over the last to decades constitute an example of pri-
vatisation? There is no easy answer to this question. While state pensions have been 
cut back, private provision often remains insufficient. While the costs of National 
Insurance pensions could be contained, there are rising expenditures on incentives 
for non-state arrangements and on means tested benefits for pensioners. While the 
market was opened to new providers and Britons today face more choice than ever 
before on how to make arrangements for their retirement, private pension provision 
became more and more regulated and supervised by the state, often in reaction to a 
number of market failures and scandals. And finally, while new forms of private 
__________ 
17 According to the ABI (2004) “7.4 million working people are still not saving at all for retirement and 
further 4.8 million are saving at too low a level to provide an adequate retirement income“. 
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provision for moderate earners are promoted by the New Labour government, the 
increasing importance of means tested benefits is seen by many as a disincentive for 
private provision. 
The British approach of shifting pension provision from state to private is a strategy 
to avoid public liabilities in the future, but it was pursued at substantial cost. Fur-
thermore, the government is challenged to find an adequate framework to accom-
modate both state and private provision. To ensure that the market delivers pensions 
appropriately it has been turned into a heavily regulated and politicised welfare mar-
ket. The state is held liable for market failures. The market regulation itself makes 
pension provision less attractive for the providers but it appears to be insufficient to 
create consumer confidence and a stronger demand for private pensions. Both pro-
viders and consumers drop out of the welfare market. The state not only has to find 
the appropriate means of market regulation, it also needs to co-ordinate the entire 
framework of public and private pension provision. It has to adopt a structure that 
ensures an adequate income for current pensioners and simultaneously makes pri-
vate provision attractive for both sides of the market. For the state the boundaries 
between public and private vanish. 
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